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Abstract 1
After a long period in which state-led development was the dominant economic paradigm, since the 1980s private sector development has been the focus for economic policy makers.
It is probably no coincidence that economic growth, stagnant for a few decades in much of the developing world, took off in the 1990s after this policy shift, and has generally remained high (in spite of a wave of crises and recessions in the late 1990s and early 2000s).
Privatization has made a great deal of progress in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, though the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have lagged somewhat. One of the main lessons for privatization policy makers in MENA countries from the experience in other regions is that merely transferring assets from the state to the private sector is not enough to ensure improved social welfare; competition and the institutional environment are also very important. With respect to the latter, much attention has focused in recent years on improvements in the business environment, which are necessary to spur entrepreneurship and encouragement movement from the informal economy into the formal sector. In this area the post-communist countries have been leaders; while Latin America and the MENA region have also seen significant improvement, they still lag behind the new European Union member states as well as some of the post-Soviet states (although the MENA region performs very well with respect to the protection of property rights). The area where the MENA region needs improvement most drastically is in the financial sector. Although rich in savings, it performs very poorly in these countries with respect to the provision of credit to the private sector (particularly small and medium-sized enterprises), largely due to the insufficient level of competition in the sector. We conclude with some speculation regarding possible scenarios for development between now and 2030.
Introduction
A period of roughly 50 years from the 1930s to the 1970s saw a great expansion in the role of state ownership in economies around the world, regardless of whether we look at socialist or capitalist countries or at rich or developing countries. The Middle East and North Africa were no exceptions, with socialist policies implemented in Israel as well as countries where variants of Arab socialism prevailed, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. In the 1980s, this trend began to reverse, with the drive to roll back the state under Reagan and Thatcher in the West and the introduction of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China at the beginning of the decade and the collapse of socialism in the Soviet bloc at its end. Today, private firms provide more than 90 percent of jobs in developing countries and are the main source of tax revenues, contributing to public funding for health, education, and other services (World Bank, 2004) . But much remains to be done to stimulate private sector development in many regions where state property has until recently been dominant. Areas of activity include both privatization of existing state-owned assets and improvement of the investment climate and business environment that will allow new private firms to flourish. In this report we will provide a broad overview of trends in the Arab world as well as in two regions -Latin America and the countries formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc -that serve as points of comparison. We will examine the relative contributions of the state-controlled and private sectors to the economies of these regions, the main sources of finance for the private sector, and the role of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in private sector development.
General trends in privatization and private sector development in developing countries
As Figure 1 depicts, the 1990s saw considerable growth in privatization revenues, climaxing in 2000. The recession that followed brought a steep decline, but the mid-2000s saw a recovery, with a record year in 2009. However, it is worth bearing in mind that even the privatization wave of the 1990s affected only a small minority of state-owned assets in the world (Ramamurti, 1999) . Figure 2 demonstrates that during this period privatization activity (measured by revenues) was very unevenly distributed in the developing world. In the 1990s, Latin America was clearly taking the lead, followed by Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia and the Pacific. The level of activity in other regions could be described as marginal. In the 2000s, the East Asia -Pacific and Eastern Europe -Central Asia regions moved into the lead, while the Latin America -Caribbean region was marginalized; the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) showed some improvement, but remained quite marginal in the overall picture.
However, one should also bear in mind that this was a bigger piece of a bigger pie: the total privatization revenue rose 43% in the last decade in comparison with the 1990s. A number of surveys of the literature on the subject show quite conclusively that private ownership is generally superior to state ownership of industry (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Nellis, 1999; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Djankov & Murrell, 2002 Competition. One of the key factors of interest here is competition in product markets, which can be at least as important as privatization itself for inducing improvements in the efficiency of the management of an enterprise (Dabrowski et al., 1991; Pinto et al., 1993; Carlin et al., 1995; Nellis, 1999; Djankov & Murrell, 2002) . Privatization will often fail to improve enterprise performance if the privatized enterprises are not forced to compete in the market, either with other domestic enterprises or with foreign competitors (or both). This result would seem to be especially important for strategic industries, which tend to be monopolies, thus indicating the need for allowing foreign competition when it is possible and the need for appropriate regulation when it is not.
Some even go so far as to suggest that in at least some cases (for example, if privatization is costly and time-consuming, putting a strain on the available resources a country has at its disposal), liberalization and deregulation might be pursued first, and privatization later (Stiglitz, 1998; Ramamurti, 1999) . In addition to capital market regulation stressed by Glaeser et al. (2001) , Nellis (1999) points to the importance of an effective mechanism for enterprise exit (bankruptcy). The importance of hard budget constraints has also been clearly shown by research (see, e.g., Dabrowski et al. 1991; Carlin et al., 1995) , which indicates that avoidance of government subsidies (whether explicit or implicit) or bailouts is important for the economic performance of firms.
Who is the private owner? Another important factor affecting the efficacy of privatization in achieving desirable restructuring results is the type of owner: some owners are better than others at inducing restructuring. The survey by Djankov and Murrell (2002) finds the overall verdict in the literature on transition countries to be a negative one for insiders (i.e., managers and employees) and a positive one for investment funds and foreigners. The positive result concerning investment funds should, however, be treated with caution in the light of studies of Polish and Czech mass voucher privatization programs, in which investment funds played a crucial role. These studies tend to show investment fund ownership being associated with poor economic performance (Weiss & Nikitin, 1998; Nellis, 1999; Blaszczyk et al., 2003) .
Political legitimacy.
Purely political factors such as public opinion are often dismissed as having no economic significance. However, they can have very important implications for the success of economic policies. In two papers, Henisz et al. (2005a, b) examine the shift from state domination to neo-liberal paradigms of economic policy, using the particular examples of privatising and deregulating reforms of the telecommunication and electricity industries in numerous countries around the world. They find that the political legitimacy of reforms has important consequences for the risk of those reforms' being rolled back, which can in turn cause serious problems for foreign investors who have moved into the deregulated and privatised industries. They identify some factors that are important for legitimacy. First, reforms have low legitimacy if a country adopts them simply in response to pressure from multilateral lenders such as the World Bank or IMF, and they have higher legitimacy if neighboring countries have adopted them. Privatisation without regulatory reform, which leaves consumers facing a private monopoly in the place of a state-owned one, also makes reforms very unpopular. The authors also find that the likelihood of adopting a comprehensive package of reforms depends on the economic performance of an industry (poor performance creates demand for reform) and on the presence of sufficient institutional checks and balances, which make domestic politicians less likely to adopt reform (since policy makers are less likely to adopt controversial measures when there is effective opposition from, e.g., the parliament) but make foreign investors more likely to enter the market due to their greater confidence that reforms will not be reversed once adopted. A statistical analysis of data on over 1,000 electrical infrastructure investment projects in 83 countries in the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] shows that countries that adopt reforms due to pressure from multilaterals tend to intervene in markets later, reversing reforms or altering reformed regulatory frameworks and thus creating serious losses for foreign investors. (Henisz et al., 2005b ).
In addition to privatization, we are also concerned in this report with private sector investment and the conditions that affect it. Foreign investment is becoming more important in developing countries, but the bulk of private investment remains domestic. Source: World Bank (2010) As one can see, the region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia ranked higher than other developing regions such as Latin America & Caribbean and MENA. Unfortunately, in many developing countries, a poor business climate leads to the informal economy accounting for more than half of economic activity (the share of informal output in GDP is shown for nine countries in Figure 5 ). Firms in the informal economy face more constraints than other firms, including insecure property rights, corruption, policy unpredictability, and, more importantly, limited access to finance and public services. Relieving these constraints allows entrepreneurs to expand their activities and provides incentives to move into the formal economy (De Soto, 1989 , 2000 .
Figure 5: Informal output as percent of GDP in nine countries
Source: Schneider (2002) he high costs of operating formally, which lead to this state of affairs, vary widely among developing countries both in level and composition. As Figure 6 depicts, the costs of contract enforcement difficulties, inadequate infrastructure, crime, corruption, and regulation can amount to over 25 percent of sales, which is more than three times what firms typically pay in taxes (World Bank, 2004) .
Figure 6: Costs of a poor business environment in 5 countries
Source: World Bank (2004) Access to external finance is also very often a barrier to private sector development, especially in developing countries. In a review of the literature on the relationship between financial sector development and economic development, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008:2) state that:
First, countries with better developed financial systems tend to grow faster. Specifically, countries with (i) large, privately owned banks that funnel credit to private enterprises and (ii) liquid stock exchanges tend to grow faster than countries with corresponding lower levels of financial development. The level of banking development and stock market liquidity each exerts an independent, positive influence on economic growth.
Second, simultaneity bias does not seem to be the cause of this result. particularly worth noting that the MENA region has the lowest levels of credit activity. We will explore this issue further for the three regions covered in this report in later sections. If we compare this figure with Figure A1 in the appendix (showing 2010 GDP per capita in these seven regions) and use the OECD countries as a benchmark, we see that sub-Saharan Africa, the East Asia-Pacific region and South Asia have market-capitalization-to-GDP ratios that are much higher than one would expect if there were a simple relationship between this ratio and a nation's per capita income, whereas the MENA region's is far lower than that of any other region. One of the most important factors in the quality of the business environment -particularly with respect to its effect on the development of the private sector -is the protection of property rights by the national justice system. In Table 1 we present a number of indices of property rights protection for the world and various regions. Of the five developing regions,
we can see that the Middle East and North Africa is in second place (behind Asia and Oceania), whereas the two other regions we are using as benchmarks -Latin America and the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Uniondo significantly more poorly, on some measures being indistinguishable from the poorestperforming region, Africa. 
Latin America
Latin America has an area of approximately 14.1% of Earth's land surface area which includes twenty countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As of 2010, it's population was estimated at more than 590 million (CIA World FACTBOOK, 2011) and its combined GDP at 5.16 trillion United States dollars (6.27 trillion at purchasing power parity) (International Monetary Fund, 2010) . The Latin American expected economic growth rate is about 5.7% for and 4% in 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2010 .
The economic growth of the area is promising. According to current predictions, two of the five largest economies in the world in 2050 will belong to this region (Brazil and Mexico, which together with China, the United States, and India are predicted to be the largest 
Savings, credit and investment
Savings have traditionally been low in Latin America (with net national savings consistently under 10% of gross domestic income since the early 1980s, compared with rates of between 14 and 16% in a comparison group of 25 developing countries), and contrary to expectations, increases in interest rates and reductions in government budget deficits and inflation rates in the most recent two decades have not changed this situation (Reinhardt 2008) . Saving rates in Latin America seem to be affected by a degree of inertia, suggesting that culture may play an important role.
Productivity in the small business sector is relatively low. One study of ten Latin American countries found that the labor productivity (the ratio of production to employment) of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) was only 20-60 percent that of the larger firms in eight of those countries; in the remaining two (Brazil and Costa Rica), where the comparison was more favorable, the best figure achieved was only 77% of the productivity of larger businesses (Peres and Stumpo, 2000) . This is linked to the fact that 80% of SMEs in the region face credit constraints (International Finance Corporation, 2010) .
On average for the region of Latin America, domestic credit to the private sector accounts for 31% to 39% of GDP during the last decade, compared to 57% in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (see section 4.1). Figure 
Business environment
As we saw in Table 1 , Latin America's performance with regard to the protection of property rights is very poor. However, there is significant differentiation within the region, as we see in Table 2 . Chile and Uruguay perform particularly well, and Costa Rica and Panama are also well above the regional average. However, there are particularly dismal performances by Venezuela and Bolivia, where the rule of law is very significantly impaired. Figure 10 depicts the overall ranking of Latin American Countries in the Ease of Doing Business. We see that Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile are well ahead of the other countries in the region; not surprisingly, given what we saw in Table 2 with respect to property rights, Venezuela and Bolivia are bringing up the rear (World Bank, 2010) .
Another comprehensive index which shows the ease of doing business is the 5-year measure of cumulative change which shows whether, and to what extent, doing business has become easier or more difficult and costly. Figure 11 shows the ranking among the countries in the region. As the figure demonstrates, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala, and Mexico (respectively) show a huge improvement (over 12% improvement in ease of doing business), followed by Paraguay (over 8%), while Argentina and Venezuela show regression. (2006) and World Bank (2010) One of the effects of a poor business environment is the fact that, as mentioned in the introduction, the informal economy accounts for more than half of economic activity in many developing countries (see Figure 5 ). As for Latin America and the Caribbean countries, informal activity accounts for about 41 percent of the region's gross domestic product (Schneider, 2002) . Firms in the informal economy face many of the same constraints as other firms, including insecure property rights, corruption, policy unpredictability, and limited access to finance and public services. Figure 13 shows the development of GDP per capita for the countries in the region during the last decade. u n g a r y K a z a k h s t a n K y r g y z s t a n L a t v i a L i t h u a n i a M e c e d o n i a M o l d o v a M o n g o l i a M o n t e n e g r o P o l a n d R o m a n i a R u s s i a S e r b i a S l o v a k i a S l o v a n i a T a j i k i s t a n T u r k m e n i s t a n U k r a i n e U z b e k i s t a n Table 3 shows the private sector share in GDP in the countries of the region. Source: EBRD (2010) The highest shares (80%) are noted in the EU member states Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia, the lowest in the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan (25%), Belarus (30%) and Uzbekistan (45%). With the exception of the latter three countries, however, all others have private sector shares of over 50%.
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Business environment
Like Latin America, this region shows overall poor performance in the area of property rights protection (Table 1) . Table 4 shows clearly that this is due to the performance of the non-EU members in the region; all except Croatia and Montenegro have IPRI scores below 5, whereas all EU member states have scores of at least 5.3. (World Bank, 2010) . Figure 15 shows Source: World Bank (2010) As figure 15 demonstrates, the highest percentage of reformers was found in Eastern and Central Europe (moreover, this was the case for the 7 th year in a row). Figure 17 depicts the results of this analysis. As one can see, the highest sectoral scores are typically in Central Europe and the Baltic states, while the lowest scores are uniformly in Central Asia. It is also interesting to note that in the most advanced CEB region, there is a significant difference between the level of reform achieved in the most reformed -corporate -and least reformed -financial -sector. Indeed, for all groups of countries the financial sector is the least reformed one; the exception is Russia, where the least reformed sector is (hardly surprisingly) energy.
In the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), firms in the region rate the main obstacles to doing business every three years.
However, the views expressed in the BEEPS are difficult to compare across firms and countries. Focusing on relative obstacle ratings removes firm differences in reference points and "tendencies to complain" from the data. This approach reveals that many transition countries share the same three main business environment concerns: skills availability, corruption, and tax administration. Poor physical infrastructure and crime are also among the top concerns, particularly further east in the region. Regression analysis of constraint determinants also suggests that despite the rise of mobile telephony, landline availability still matters; that transparent implementation of tax rules may matter more than simpler documentation or less tax preparation time, and that removing skill bottlenecks is more important than increases in education spending (EBRD, 2010) . The low level of competition in the banking sector is related to the high share of state-owned banks in the sector. As we can see in Figure 23 , extensive privatization of the banking sector has taken place everywhere in the world in the last 40 years. Interestingly, while the Middle East and North African region has participated in this trend, it has done less than the other regions and is still left with one of the largest state shares (second only to South Asia Though larger and relatively privileged (for example, they face lower funding costs), stateowned banks have inferior profitability compared to those in the private sector . The effects of the low degree of competition in the sector can be seen in Figure 24 , showing the percentage of firms with loans or credit lines from financial institutions in various regions.
Foreign Direct Investment
As we can see, the Middle East and North Africa region is one of the poorest performers with respect to lending to both large firms and SMEs. Given that, as we have seen ( Figures 20   and 22 ), the region does well in terms of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, it is clear that the lending activity of banks in the region is strongly focused on a narrow, privileged group of customers. In addition to the low level of competition, some factors indicated as underlying the low level of lending to the SME sector by Rocha et al. (2011) include: poor registries of movable assets that could be used as collateral, poor public credit registries, and the scarcity of private credit bureaus that could improve the availability of credit information (Figure 24 ). 
Business environment
As we saw in Table 1 , this region is one of the leaders in the developing world with respect to the security of property rights. As we have seen with other regions, however, there is considerable variance across countries (Table 6) 
Conclusions
The business environment in the MENA region cannot be characterized as a favorable one, but it is far from being so poor as to preclude development, as in the case of much of subSaharan Africa; it is even significantly better than that of South Asia, which has experienced a great deal of private sector development in the last two decades. (Four countries in the region can be singled out as having particularly poor business environments: Iran, Algeria, Syria and Iraq, the latter having one of the worst in the world, largely due to internal security problems.) Private property rights are on the average relatively well protected in the region, especially with regard to physical (as opposed to intellectual) property, where protection levels are almost on a par with the developed world. It is, however, important to remember that this is a regional average, and if we look at particular countries, we note that there are several where the situation with regard to the protection of property rights is very far below the average (these countries include Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, with the situation especially dire in Libya).
Privatization has made a great deal of progress in the developing world, particularly in Latin America, though the MENA countries have lagged somewhat. Privatization policy makers in these countries need to pay particular attention to improvements in competition and the institutional environment, as the region suffers particular deficits in these areas, particularly with respect to competition. With respect to the latter, much attention has focused in recent years on improvements in the business environment, which are necessary to spur entrepreneurship and encouragement movement from the informal economy into the formal sector. In this area the post-communist countries have been leaders; while Latin America and the MENA region have also seen significant improvement, they still lag behind the new European Union member states as well as some of the post-Soviet states (although the MENA region performs very well with respect to the protection of property rights). The area where the MENA region needs improvement most drastically is in the financial sector.
Although rich in savings, it performs very poorly in these countries with respect to the provision of credit to the private sector (particularly small and medium-sized enterprises), largely due to the insufficient level of competition in the sector. A few countries (including Egypt, Lebanon and Libya) have even seen significant decreases in domestic lending to the private sector as a percentage of GDP in the last decade (although the regional trend was in the opposite direction).
